To Nuke or Not to Nuke

A nuclear weapon is tested in Russia

(ALAMY)

When nuclear weapons come to mind, there is often hysteria associated with them, the end of the world, destruction of the Earth, end of life as we know it. The public has a vague idea of what nuclear weapons are and what their purpose is in grand strategy, and it’s time to change that. The media consistently overplays the threat of nuclear annihilation, but since the inception of these weapons of mass destruction, they were only ever used twice. While there may have been close calls, the nature of the beast is what has prevented the destruction of humanity. Nuclear policy has not been at the forefront of mass media, and many normal people only understand nuclear strategy as the concept of “big bomb go boom” rather than a complex mechanism of life and death. There is clear and present danger to nations that have given up their nuclear arsenals in the name of globalization and nonproliferation, and most are either nonexistent or controlled by foreign powers. That is why altering nuclear strategy is critical to resolving further crises in the Middle East, East Asia, and potential future conflicts around the world.

The War That Never Went Hot

The end of the Second World War and the subsequent decline of the traditional European imperial powers led to the establishment of a bipolar conflict between the United States and Soviet Union. The atmosphere was extremely tense as the United States had acquired and used the nuclear bomb for the first time in human history, and the Soviets amassed the largest army ever assembled, over 12 million men. 

At first, there was a reasonable balance of power between both superpowers, as the United States had roughly less than a dozen nuclear weapons without the means to bomb Moscow, and the Soviets could have overrun Allied-occupied Europe in less than the week. The problem in the system arose after the Soviets attained the bomb in 1949, leading to a delicate balance being established. The dynamic between the two nations became one of indirect interference and proxy wars. 

The nuclear capabilities of each nation gradually increased with the development of the hydrogen bomb in 1952 by the Americans, and in 1953 for the Soviets. The means of weapon delivery also changed with advancements in strategic bombers, missiles, and naval technology. Although there were hot flashes, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was never a direct nuclear confrontation between the United States and the USSR, reflecting the overall success of nuclear parity as a means to prevent wide scale conflict. While factors such as human intervention and diplomacy have contributed to the prevention of our annihilation, “nuclear balance” creates the necessary atmosphere to maintain peace and security in our world today. 

Robert Jervis, a Cold War nuclear strategist, explains how “adversaries possessing nuclear weapons would exercise caution to avoid major wars and any crossing of the nuclear threshold. At the same time, their ‘insurance policy’ of nuclear retaliation provided ample leeway to engage in crisis-provoking behavior, proxy wars, and mischief-making.” 

In turn, balance was established, and low-level conventional conflicts could occur without the threat of escalation. Therefore, it is the inherent lack of nuclear balance that has created the instability and conflict in Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle East. There is also a clear danger to not having nuclear weapons, causing the conditions that damage the well-being of millions, most notably in the Middle East.

The Arab Triplets

The authoritarian states of Syria, Iraq and Libya are carbon copies of one another. Each head of state attempted to build a nuclear bomb with their state either on the verge of ruin or full-blown civil war. These situations are not mutually exclusive, but the ramifications of foreign intervention and imbalance have contributed to the instability seen in the region today. Each of these states wished to attain weapons of mass destruction as a means to protect themselves from the perceived threat of Israel, while also making lofty claims of utilizing these weapons against Israel itself.

Iraq and Syria, led by Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad respectively, had nuclear capabilities thanks to the French selling nuclear reactors to the dictators. However, the Israelis, under the guise of maintaining nuclear superiority in the region, launched strikes against Syrian and Iraqi reactors in Deir-al Zour and Osirak in the 1980s, crippling the nuclear programs of both states in a blatant violation of national sovereignty. 

Libya, while separated geographically from the Israeli conflict, was the closest Arab state to attaining the bomb, due to the pressure from dictator Mu'ammar Al-Qadhdhāfī. However, each state was systematically forced to dismantle and destroy its nuclear program, by force. The West sanctioned Libya for their involvement in the Lockerbie bombings and invasions of Egypt and Chad, but came to an agreement with NATO to denuclearize in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and re-entrance into the economic fold of the West.

The United States forced Iraq to dismantle its Weapons of Mass Destruction program after the 1991 Gulf War, and Syria became embroiled in a violent civil war that it has yet to recover from. 

Why does all this matter? The desire of these states to wield the power of the atom was not offensive in nature, but was rather used as a bargaining chip against the United States and to a lesser extent Israel. Ironically enough, Iraq collapsed after a second US invasion in 2003, Syria also crumbled after a US-supported civil war, and Libya fell to a US-sponsored coup of Qadhdhāfī in 2011. These states were already in decline by the time the United States tipped the scales against the regimes, but the effects of such interventions, regardless of intention, have led to the destabilization of the Middle East and a lower quality of life for millions. Now this begs the question, what if these states had the bomb? Would the Middle East look differently than it did today?  

 The North Korean Tiger

North Korea is not a good example to look up to, except for regimes that are under threat from Western intervention, which makes North Korea a prime candidate for why nuclear proliferation is a viable option. Although the North Korean government has egregiously violated human rights and is a horrific regime, the United States has not intervened on the peninsula since 1953. The overall stability of the regime has kept a refugee crisis or humanitarian conflict from arising, and as shown by Iraq and Libya, the regime sees nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the United States, and even arguably from China as well. North Korea first demonstrated its nuclear capabilities in 2006 and has expanded its arsenal to include intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the Western United States. While nominally offensive in nature, the contention that these weapons are defensive tends to hold true because of the rationality of Kim Jong-un. 

Ranging from Saddam Hussein to Vladimir Putin, there is a clear understanding of the nuclear threshold, which is the utter destruction of the state and an eventual nuclear holocaust. Therefore, leaders are rational enough to not destroy their state, but most importantly their power base. Kim Jong-un has his finger on the button, but will never push it. That is why the United States, South Korea and Japan have refrained from intervening as they did in Iraq. North Korea is an international threat and a pariah of the West, but there is nothing inherently wrong with producing nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the United States. 

Iraq, Libya and Syria were barred from this deterrent, and all were either dismembered externally and from within and left in ruin. North Korea, seeing the writing on the wall, took the only rational option to develop nuclear weapons to protect themselves from a perceived American threat. As a result, there is now a balance in East Asia, with the nuclear umbrella of the United States protecting South Korea and Japan, leading to no direct conflict and a delicate peace in the region.

Skirmishes on the Subcontinent

On the Indian subcontinent, there are two nuclear powers that have been at each other’s throats since the inception of their territories: India and Pakistan. Before the nuclearization of the subcontinent, there were various conflicts between the two states, some of which even included China. India, following the stalemate of a border conflict with China in the 1960s, wished to nuclearize in order to stave off further Chinese aggression in the future. 

However, in response to India’s nuclear test, Pakistan, the longstanding rival of India, also finished developing the bomb in 1998, turning the conflict into a potential hot zone for nuclear war. Many in the international community believe that the subcontinent is the most likely location for a conflict to turn “hot,” but there is hope for the potential of the opposite. The dynamics between the three nuclear powers in the region have prevented major hostilities from taking place, excluding several skirmishes in the Kashmir region and on the Indo-Chinese border. 

Both states combined have a population of 1.6 billion people, and a nuclear war would be utterly catastrophic for them, yet they are aware of the consequences. Nuclear weapons have deterred the use of force and have encouraged dialogue between India and Pakistan, alongside the Chinese. Pakistan and India have not declared war on each other in over 30 years, and most of the current conflicts are conventionally-based around the borders or in Kashmir. 

Furthermore, the balance established by each side possessing 100-200 nuclear weapons with similar delivery capabilities has prevented a full-scale arms race, allowing for each government to focus on economic innovations and domestic issues. However, this example is a prime example of why one of the world’s most “irrational” states should get the bomb: Iran.

The Persian Threat, or is it?

Before we dive into why Iran should get the bomb, or if it is even a threat, we need to talk about rationality. The leading argument against nuclear proliferation is that certain nations lack the stability that requires owning and commanding nuclear power. Debates are often framed on how irrational prospective nuclear powers are, such as Iraqi aggression in the 1980s and 1990s, North Korean rhetoric, and the infamous Iranian threats to wipe Israel off the face of the Earth. 

These are the primary justifications as to why the leading nuclear powers wish to prevent the expansion of WMDs to “unstable” regimes, or to any nation. However, rationality is subjective, and what is rational to the United States is by no means what is rational to Iran, Iraq, China or even Russia. That does not mean these regimes are inherently good, but strategically, from their perspective, it makes the most sense for them to attain nuclear weapons, for their safety and for the continuation of their regime, as the United States has no right to infringe on the rights of sovereign states based on their own interests.

Deal with the Devil

There is a clear disparity in power between Iran and Israel over nuclear weapons. Israel, from the onset of its nuclear program, has instituted a policy of plausible deniability regarding nukes, but the consensus is that they have both first and second-strike capabilities and over 100 warheads. Iran, on the other hand, has none, and has been forced to correct the imbalance of power by funding various rebel groups in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. The Persians are attempting to gain support against Israel by forming a quasi-Shia coalition, while also playing cat and mouse with the West over the Iran Nuclear Deal. Following a decade of nuclear research, the United States and the European Union, in an attempt to curb nuclear proliferation, reached an agreement with the Iranian government and implemented the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. 

The JCPOA, colloquially known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, forced Iran to radically reduce their nuclear capabilities, promoting civilian nuclear power alongside economic concessions, with the aim of buying over Iran to prevent the state from building the bomb. The JCPOA was effective at curbing Iranian nuclear ambitions, and there was a relative era of stability in the region, until the Trump administration revoked the JCPOA in 2017. The main rationale for the JCPOA was to curb Iranian aggression against Israel, and to a certain extent, it worked. However, the Iranian government, similar to Libya, was granted reintegration into the global economy and other incentives, in exchange for denuclearization. 

But as Iran’s strategic value to the West runs out, the regime will have the same fate as Libya. Iran, and to an extent North Korea, now see any sort of nuclear agreement as a mechanism to buy the West time for potential regime change and will be less likely to engage in negotiations. In fact, it would be more fruitful for the West to allow the Iranians to get the bomb for a more balanced Middle East. 

The main proponent of this theory, Kenneth Waltz,  prominent international relations theorist,  proposes that if the Iranian state got the bomb, it would stabilize the Middle East by establishing nuclear parity between Israel and Iran. Waltz’s principal argument is that “nuclear weapons create stability,” and that “this stability permits lower-level violence. [By] taking advantage of the protection that their atomic arsenals provide, nuclear-armed states can feel freer to make minor incursions, deploy terrorism, and engage in generally annoying behavior.” 

War is an endeavor of costs and benefits, and in a “nuclear war, there are no benefits; it will only increase your costs, so nuclear weapons can prevent wars.” 

Because Iran does not have a nuclear weapon, it utilizes conventional tactics to display its aggression towards Israel, engaging in proxy conflicts and posturing its military prowess. Israel is a perceived security threat to Iran, with the Iranians woefully aware of Israeli strikes towards Iraq and Syria, and the routine violation of Iranian sovereignty. And granted, the opposite is also true, but because of Israel’s nuclear umbrella and unwavering US support, Iran has been pushed into a corner. It is only a matter of time until the United States intervenes in Iran as it did in Libya, Iraq and Syria, and destabilizes the region further, unless Iran obtains nuclear weapons, and parity can be reached.

There is a potential scenario that could play out that would, in theory, eliminate the need for nuclear weapons in the first place: the reconstruction of trust in the promises of the United States. One of the primary justifications for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by all states mentioned is fear of Western intervention, necessitating some sort of deterrence method to achieve strategic parity with the West. Dr. McCage Griffiths, lecturer of Political Science at UC Davis, explains how the relationship between the United States and Iran does not inherently have to be one of adversaries. The issues between the US and Iran stem from a lack of interdependence, which was nearly achieved under the JCPOA. The Iranians were shown to be trustworthy negotiators and held up their end of the bargain, whereas it was the United States that reneged on its promises and has led Iran to fear for its sovereignty. If the United States, and the West as a whole, begin a rapprochement with Iran and ultimately address the factors that are pushing Iran to pursue a nuclear weapons program, there could be a degree of peace in the region.

It is almost ironically coincidental that all the states that have attempted a nuclear weapons program have been subject to some degree United States intervention, which to an extent undergirds the nuclear justifications of these states. The issue lies with the nature of the United States, which is to maintain strategic leverage in regions where it has national interests. Therefore, another potential solution to the nuclear problem would be to resolve the credibility problem the United States currently faces and expunge the need for nuclearization in the first place.

A Nuclear Arab State after all?

There is a caveat to the argument, however, and that is the effect of Iranian behavior on Saudi Arabia, another key player in the region. The Kingdom has made it emphatically clear that it will nuclearize if Iran does, potentially purchasing nuclear technology from its regional ally Pakistan, as it has rumored to have attempted in the past. As aforementioned with the India-Pakistan-China scenario, nuclear weapons do allow for conflicts to occur, but following the nuclearization of all three states in the 1990s, the conflicts have been relatively minor compared to prior conflicts, with several minor conflicts that have been diffused before transforming into large-scale wars. 

The same principle can be applied to the Middle East, where the establishment of nuclear parity between the leading regional powers can and will create relative stability with minor low-level conflicts occurring over time. Thus, the involvement of nuclear weapons in a conflict can become a tool used to achieve diplomatic solutions to various crises, because “the impossibility of military victory and the grave risks associated with nuclear war may have led states to alter their immediate goals and explore a diplomatic settlement.” As a result, the establishment of nuclear parity within the Middle East will in fact promote regional security because each state will be less likely to escalate the ongoing conflicts in the region and be further incentivized to come to the table and negotiate rather than commence a full-scale war.

Each state will be deterred from the other, and the Arab Cold War dynamics will in fact remain in effect, with Iranian, Saudi, and Israeli spheres of influence remaining in contestation, essentially creating a tri-polar Cold War in the Middle East. As previously mentioned, the Cold War reference is key to this scenario, because while the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union was tense, it was stable and created an international system of proxy conflicts without full-blown war. Therefore, the model tends to suggest that the nuclearization of Iran and Saudi Arabia will promote regional security and stability. Further benefits to this scenario range from limited foreign intervention, as shown through the India-Pakistan conflict following nuclearization, to decreased overall tension and an uptick in diplomatic viability. 

The Nuclear Bear, the Cautious Eagle and the Rising Dragon

The United States of America has been a staunch supporter of nonproliferation, yet wishes to maintain a strategic edge over its adversaries with one of the largest nuclear arsenals internationally. The Russians and the Chinese have been attempting to bridge the gap with advancements in hypersonic missiles, nuclear submarines and the production of several nuclear aircraft carriers. These advancements have emboldened the Chinese and Russian regimes to increase their aggression in the South China Sea and Strait of Taiwan, and the invasion of Ukraine. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is exactly why a nation ought to be able to develop and maintain nuclear capabilities. Ironically enough, the Ukrainians at one point did have nuclear weapons left over from the Soviet Union, but in an agreement with the new Russian Federation, the Ukrainians gave up their nukes in exchange for a guarantee of sovereignty.

The Russians have launched incursions into multiple former Soviet states, such as Moldova, Georgia and Kazakhstan, all of which do not have the capabilities to defend themselves from a larger enemy. Even Taiwan, with favorable terrain and advanced American weapons, cannot last long from a potential Chinese invasion. The invasion of Ukraine is proof of how nonproliferation only emboldens nuclear nations to intervene for their own interests. The United States has prominently done so in Syria, Libya and Iraq, and other nuclear-powered states such as the United Kingdom and France have launched coups to economically exploit their former colonial possessions. If these states had the ultimate means to defend themselves from aggression, it would be much more difficult for states to destabilize weaker countries. This would wreak havoc on American hegemony, and balance the scales in favor of diplomacy and lower-intensity conflict, which can and will lead to a lower likelihood of state failure and intervention. 

Rational Nuclear Deterrence as a Means to an End

The current mechanics of the international system tend to refrain from nuclear expansion, claiming that more nukes will increase the likelihood of them being used. However, no state has used a nuclear weapon since 1945, and there are already enough nukes to destroy the world a thousand times over. In fact, it is simply egregious that certain nations maintain nuclear hegemony and reap the benefits of being, quite literally, untouchable. Naysayers will claim that nuclear weapons in the wrong hands, such as Vladimir Putin, can increase the chances that they will be used out of sheer desperation. While plausible, this is simply not the case because

Weak and small countries will not use nuclear weapons irresponsibly. There is a good chance that they will be defeated in a conventional war. Nukes are their last resort, so they will save their nukes for final battles. They will only use those nukes if survival is at stake, certainly not for reckless invasion.” 

The defensive use of nuclear weapons should not be something to be shunned, but rather encouraged, especially if you have aggressive neighbors such as Russia and China, or if you are threatened by the United States. The Middle East may have been saved from destruction if the Arab Triplets were allowed to wield nuclear weapons. Ukraine could still be at peace with Crimea still part of the country. We have seen peace with nuclear weapons in the Indian subcontinent, with the threat of nuclear annihilation preventing their use in conflict unless absolutely necessary. Humans are rational creatures, and calling certain leaders or states irrational is not conducive for international stability. Rather, granting states the ultimate symbol of sovereignty, control and production of the most powerful weapon on Earth can save the world from destruction.