The Future of Fundamentalist Sunni Terrorism
Al-Qaida fighters group in the Levant, Al-Nusra Front, wave their movement's flag, Rami al-Sayed AFP Getty Images.
It has been nearly two decades since the fateful 9/11 attacks and the beginning of the American-led Global War on Terrorism. Since then, the U.S. and its allies have waged a constant battle against violent Muslim fundamentalist groups, the majority of which follow versions of Salafist Sunni Islam. While different organizations have risen and fallen over time, the ideology motivating these fanatical killers has persisted, and it will continue to threaten the geopolitical stability of the global community for decades to come.
For the first 15 years of the War on Terrorism, the main terrorist organization determined to fight the West and its allies was al-Qaeda, led by the infamous Osama bin Laden. The organization was spread throughout the world, with branches stretching from the Sahara to the Philippines. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 allowed the group to strengthen its presence in the Middle East and recruit fighters from across the globe, all determined to fight what they perceived as blatant American imperialism. However, after the death of their leader in 2011 and the sustained U.S. military campaign against their home base in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda diminished in power, and their preeminence among jihadi groups began to wane. This decline, combined with the chaos unleashed by the Syrian Civil War, allowed a breakaway faction of al-Qaeda to form the Islamic State (IS), which quickly supplanted its parent organization in brutality and ability to draw in new recruits.
In 2014, IS, led by their self proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, quickly gained control of territory throughout eastern Syria and western Iraq, terrorizing all who opposed their extremist interpretation of Islam. As the group gained in notoriety, organizations from around the world pledged allegiance to al-Bagdadi, from Boko Haram in West Africa to Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. IS had eclipsed al-Qaeda, whose leadership went so far as to disavow the brutal methods and strategy of their offshoot.
However, beginning in 2017, IS began to lose ground in the face of determined opposition on all fronts. The American-led coalition backed the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria, while Russian forces backed the Syrian Arab Army of the Assad regime in the south, slowly squeezing the Islamic State until they lost their final territorial hold in March 2019, at the battle of Baghuz Fawqani. Although IS retained a vast network of cells and supporters throughout the region, this blow greatly weakened their ability to coordinate and control their forces.
This decline was further compounded by the recent elimination of the IS caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi earlier this year. On the night of October 26, 2019, U.S. special operations forces, composed of Delta Force and the 75th Ranger Regiment, descended on a compound in the northwestern Syrian province of Idlib, which led to the death of IS caliph al-Baghdadi. This death was touted as a significant victory in the fight against the organization, and epitomizes the leadership decapitation that has occurred during the last year. This loss has raised important questions, namely will the Islamic State survive?
Although the elimination of their leader will diminish morale throughout the organization, IS has transitioned from a quasi-state to a classic terrorist nebula, in which common ideology is a greater unifier than a centralized command structure. Former IS fighters are spread throughout Europe and the Middle East, with the majority still supporting the Salafist ideology that motivated them in the first place. Networks of active sleeper cells are set up throughout the Sunni regions of Syria and Iraq, commiting acts of terrorism whenever the opportunity arises.
Meanwhile, groups affiliated with IS continue to carry out violent attacks. For example, the threat of Boko Haram continues to be so destabilizing to nations in West Africa that the governor of the Nigerian province of Borno recently authorized the raising of thousands of hunters as an anti-terrorist militia. Many experts worry that IS will try its best to carry out revenge attacks on targets in Europe, and assuredly the organization will continue to act as an inspiration for killers around the globe.
Although IS is losing its cohesiveness as an organization, other groups have in fact strengthened over the last several years. The Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, initially known as the al-Nusra Front, and now called Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HST), has grown in power and is today the strongest rebel faction in the country. It controls the northwestern province of Idlib and continues to hold the support of the local population. With an estimated 20,000 fighters in 2019, it is the largest branch of al-Qaeda, but by no means is it the only one.
Throughout Africa, al-Qaeda franchises continue to carry out indiscriminate attacks on civilian and military targets. The Somalian-based group al-Shabab is the most violent, having carried out over 400 violent attacks throughout eastern Africa in the last three years alone. In the North African regions of the Sahara and Sahel, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as well as smaller IS affiliated organizations, wage war against the region’s governments and their western allies. The groups located in this area take full advantage of the historical smuggling routes in their region to fund themselves through arms, drugs, and human trafficking.
These different organizations have been historically isolated from their centralized leadership and have always followed the direction of local lieutenants well versed in the geopolitics of their region. Similar to the death of Osama bin Laden, the demise of al-Baghdadiwill not hamper the ability of these groups to plan and execute attacks. Furthermore, although the presence of NATO troops around the globe is crucial for local governments to combat these terrorist networks, their very presence serves as a raison d’etre for these violent organizations. The very fact that IS has lost its caliph and caliphate may allow it to reconcile with its parent organization and create a fractured decentralized terrorist nebula of unprecedented size and strength.
As such, the forces of democracy cannot cease their vigilance and determination in combating these hateful organizations, who justify the exactions they cause on their twisted and corrupted interpretation of Islam. The Muslim world has always been the primary victims of these fundamentalists, and the West must recognize this reality. Military operations dedicated solely to the extermination of terrorists may succeed in eliminating key leaders in the short run, but they will fail at securing long-term stability. Instead, America and its allies must use a range of military, economic, and political options in order to strengthen and bolster sovereign democratic governments across the developing world. Rather than attempt to dictate local geopolitics, the West must learn to support its regional allies without dictating their actions, as the only solutions to the question of Islamic terrorism will come from those who experience it on a daily basis.